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IN THE SUPREME, COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FRANZ B. SCHICK and MARYEVE
S. SCHICK, his wife,
Plaintiffs and AppelZants,
-vs.RAYMOND J. ASHTON, RAYMOND L. EVANS AND B.
EUGENE BRAZIER, a partnership, doing business as ASHTON,
EVANS & BRAZIER, Architects
and Engineers,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 8651

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is from a jury verdict awarding defendants ( respondent.s) damages against the plaintiffs
(appellants) (R. 58) and finding no cause of action
on the plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants (R.
59). The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
The action is to recover damages against the defendants for the breach of an oral agreement, whereby
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defendants agreed to perform all architectural services
necessary for the con.str:uction of a home for plaintiffs
in the Holladay District, Salt Lake County, Utah, particularly the design, specifications, letting of contract
and supervision to completion of an adequate heating
system, which heating system was to be designed ·and
constructed in such a manner as to accommodate at a
future date a mechanical refrigeration cooling system
(R. 1-2).
The defendants admit that they represent themselves to be skilled architects and building engineers
(R. 1, 3). They admit that an oral contract was entered
into on or about April 1, 1952, with plaintiffs for their
services for an agreed fee of 6% of the total construction cost. They admit that they .agreed to and did prepare specifications ~and working drawings to meet local
climatic conditions, and that they obtained bids for the
construction of the home and let contracts for the same
and agreed to and did supervise the construction to
completion (R. 1, 3-4). By counterclaim defendants allege
that the cost of the home to plaintiffs was n10re than
$35,000.00 and that on the 6% fee arrangement there
was an unpaid balance of $1,107..±7 for their services
as architects and for which they prayed judgn1ent (R.
4-5). The jury verdict in defendants' favor awarded
defendants $400.00 on their counterclailn. The rationale
of the jury verdict i.s not disclosed by the record.
B. Eugene Brazier, one of the defendants, testified
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that he was familiar with Dr. Schick's sensitivities as
to heating systems and construction because of an inadequate system in a previous home owned by Dr. Schick
in the s.ame neighborhood (R. 76-77); that the oral agreement between the parties wa.s an acceptation by defendants of the basic design as proposed by Richard N eutra,
who was known to Mr. Brazier as an outstanding architect
(R. 93-95). N eutra never specifically designed the heating and cooling system which is the subject of this lawsuit. For the fee of 6% of the total construction cost
Mr. Brazier's firm was to establish by acce~ted engineering principles the size and type of the units neces·sary to the operation of the he.ating and air conditioning
system and of the duct runs and registers and upon
completion of construction was to balance and check
the perfonnance for maximum efficiency (R. 93). The
defendants, by their own testimony of the oral agreement, were to prepare details required for interpretation of construction plans and to supervise the construction with regard to all of the contractor's documents; to prepare all necessary working drawings ·adhering to the design of Richard Neutra, with adaptation
requested by the owner; to make bids and prep.are contracts between owner and contractor, to approve shop
drawings which would include drawings .submitted by
any of the fabricators, such as a heat layout like the
Airfloor Corporation or like Modern Air (R. 92-93).
It was the Airfloor Corporation that submitted the
Airfloor duct system installed in plaintiffs' home (R.
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100) and the Modern Air Company (R. 109) that submitted the two dual hot air furnaces actually installed
in the home, and which were to be used in connection
with the Airfloor duct system, all with the approval
of the defendants (R. 108-110) .and as shown in the
basic drawings prepared by defendants and introduced
in evidence as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 (R. 96). The defendants considered the installation as adequate to provide
·a comfortable heating arrangement and to heat the house
well (R. 109-110).
The Airfloor heating plan was actually prepared
by Airfloor Company of California, Inc. and adopted
by defendants (R. 100), and was one of the contr.actural
documents published by the defendants and for which
they as.sumed responsibility as they did for all drawings
so published by them, as well as responsibility for the
functional characteristics of the same (R. 103). :Jir.
Brazier considered the use of l\{odern ~-i_ir Company's
warm .air furnaces in connection ''ith the airfloor form
installations as ultin1ately installed a:s being adequate
to hea;t the house well, and when he approved the contractor's charge for payment he concluded that all of
the things that went into the construction of the home
were done "meticulously well" (R. 110), even though
Dr. Schick rmnplained to hi1n about the inadequacies of
the heating S)rstem before the hmne was finished and
occupied. Defendants had full knowledge of Dr.
Sehie.k's sensitivitie.s ·with respect thereto (R. 111).
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The defendants had the overall responsibility to
supervise the entire construction of plaintiffs' home
(R. 84). The contractor had to perform to the satisfaction of the defendant architects (R. 90) before final
payment (R. 94), which p.ayment was ultimately approved (R. 110). The defendants prepared the construction contract (R. 105-106) and prior to its preparation
had concluded upon the installation of the two hot air
furnace.s as being appropriate and entirely adequate
for use with the .airfloor duct system, which ducts were
encased in concrete under the floor of the home (R. 88).
Exhibit 1, the architects sheet number 11 showing the
duct .system, represents a new and novel plan for a
heating and cooling system. The defendants conceded
responsibility for the drawing and particularly the location of the furnaces and the functional .side of the
situation (R. 103).
Plaintiffs' witness Howard J. Hassell, a licensed,
consulting mechanical engineer, made careful tests of
the heating installation in plaintiffs' home and found
that the two warm air furnaces were unable to deliver
their rating to the heating space, the principal re.ason
being that they could not get return air back to them.
He found that there was not an adequate delivery of
air for the space that wa.s intended to be heated. In
terms of adequacy Mr. Hassell concluded that 3000
c. f. m. would he a good design figure and 2000 c. f. m.
a minimum (Ex. 26) for the entire home and that in
terms of deliverability the installation approved by de-
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fendant architects delivered something less than 1000
c. f. m. (R. 121-122). The restriction in the heating
system apparent from the architects' plans w.as in the
dimensions and configuration of the airfloor fonns
buried in concrete beneath the floor (R. 122-132). It
would have been more difficult by reason of the construction to cool the home by an air conditioning system
through the ducts that were installed than to heat it,
the basic difficulty being that of circulating the required
amount of air (R. 132-133).
Defendants' witness Olsen, a licensed professional
engineer, corrobated in its major aspects the te.stimony
of Mr. Hassell. In a letter opinion, Exhibit 46, :Mr.
Olsen states, among other things, that the return air
grille system is particularly undersized. He testified
that until the air is permitted to flow freely and quietly
back to the furnace the system cannot and will not give
satisfactory operation (R. 428, Exhibit 58). He likewise
set a figure of 2160 c.f.m. to adequately deliver air
throughout the house (R. 453, Exhibit 59).
Exhibit 46 was a report written by defendants'
witness Olsen and directed to the plaintiffs. It is stated
that the return .air duct work entering at the top of
the furnace's is unnecessarily cramped for space; that
a revision "of that duct work to take better advantage
of the available space would decreU;se the resistence in
the return air system .and might possibly alleviate some
of the noise in the ducts"; that the air flowing from
each register is considerably less than the designed
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cubic feet per minute ( c.f.m.) indicated on the architects'
heating plans; that probably the biggest reason why
actual c. f. m. capacitie.s ~are low is the f.act that there
is too little return grille area to accommodate all the
return air; that the lack of adequate return air grilles
in the South end of the house results in excessive noise;
that registered temperatures below 80° F ..are considered
to be undesirable in baseboard installations as they
result in objectionable drafts; that the low temperatures
noted during the tests would probably not occur if air
circulation was improved through an enlarged return
.air system; that during the tests no regis tered temperatures were taken during the first thirty minutes after
the therrqostats were set up to 85° F. The witness
testified that on February 20, 1954, with the outside
temperature ranging between 15° F. and 28° F. during
the two-hour period from 7 :30 A.M. to 9 :30 A.M., with
'the thermostat set to 85°, the temperature in the utility
room was 58° and in the kitchen 60° and in the living
Doom 65°; that the above temperature recovery rates
are not satisfactory, being much too low, and that it
is impractical to produce effective smmner cooling
through the use of a floor panel •and baseboard registers
(R. 436-440).
1

Defendants never made a full and adequate balance
and test of the completed system as they had .admittedly
undertaken to do as a specific term of the oral contract,
but certain tes'ts were made by the defendants in connection with the adequacy of the air delivery system.
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The highest readings for air delivery that the defendants
ever produced w.as 1684 c. f. m. (Exhibit 61. This exhibit
was prepared by Mr. Brown, a witness for the defendants, R. 506). This figure should be compared with the
c. f. m. specified on 'the architects' drawings which
were considerably higher than the absolute minimum
c. f. m. for adequate air delivery established by defendants' expert Olsen at 2160. The plantiffs' expert Rassell
examined the system and found less than 1000 c. f. m.
forthcoming.
The plaintiffs by motion (R. 580) and by their requested instruction number 1 (R. 14) requested the court
to submit to the jury only the que.stion of plaintiffs'
damages on the ground that the evidence in the case
establishes the defendants' liability .as a matter of law
for having designed and permitted the installation of
an inadequate heating and cooling system in the plaintiffs' home (R. 580). In the motion the testimony of
the defendant Brazier .and the witness Olsen wa.s pointed
to as having established the defendants' liability. The
motion was denied by the refusal of the court to give
the requested instruction mentioned.
The plaintiffs, and their family consisting of three
children at the time and Dr. Schick's elderly n1other,
had to we.ar sweaters and coats most of the tin1e in
cold weather while the temperatures in the home ranged
from 62° to 65° (R. 259-260). Photographs in evidence
show extreme frosting of the windows both inside and
out (R. 263). Fuel bills were excessiYe .and the discomfort
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to the family obvious. The drafts were excessive and
everything possible to be done wa.s done by the plaintiffs to keep out the cold and inclement weather (R.
275). The plaintiffs suffered physic.al and mental anguish
and distress by reason of the conditions aggravated by
the fact that there were small children and 'the anxiety
and worry about keeping them warm under the circumstances.
C. Fr.ancis Solomon, a re,al estate appraiser of many
years experience in the Salt Lake Valley, testified that
a defective or inadequate heating sys'tem in the home
would affect the market price of the same for the reason
that the seller and any re•al estate .agent would be obligated to divulge to an interested and willing purchaser
all of the faets that might influence the value of the
property, and particularly a fact of such ,a fundamental
character as the heating facilities (R. 112-114).
Both Howard J. Hassell and Raymond A. Pons
testified that the concrete floor would have to be extensively broken up to repair the ducJt system (R. 131,
139, 143-145, 242) and neither would guarantee the results (R. 131, 247).
The facts will be further detailed in our argument.
This appeal, with the whole record before the court,
involves questions primarily of law which go to the
basic question of the contractural obligation by express
agreement whereby the defendant architects professing
to have the requisite skill, ability and competency .agreed
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to design and see to the installation of an adequate
heating and cooling system in plaintiffs' home. The
contract theory of the action was recognized by the
defendants at the trial (R. 328-329). The defendant
Brazier accepted full responsibility for the functioning
of the plans (R. 103).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
A concise statement of 'the points upon which the
plaintiffs rely are a.s follows:
1. The trial court erred in submitting to the jury
the question of defendants' liability, in light of the admitted oral agreement to design and have installed an
adequate heating and cooling system.
2. The trial court erred in its instructions to the
jury, and particularly in Instruction No. 5 (R. 49, 585586) in that the instruction ignores the express contract
between the parties, whereby the defendants agreed to
a .satisfactory and adequate heating and cooling system
and limits the architects' "efficiency" to the knowledge
that was available at the time the drawings and plans
were prepared. The instruction erroneously states, in
light of the contract, that the mere fact of an inaccuracy
in the plans or drawings or some imperfection in the
work would not render the architects liable to the owners
for damages, and charges the jury that the defendants
would only be required to exercise the skill ordinarily
and re~asonably required of one in their profession. The
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exceptions taken to Instruction No. 5 are found in the
record at pages 593-594.
Under 'this point error is claimed for the giving of
Instruction No. 6 (R. 50, 586-587, Exception R. 594).
In Instruction No. 6 the trial court speaks of the defendant architects not be liable for "subjectively" imposed
standards by Dr. and Mr.s. Schick in the absence of some
express agreement to the contrary and ignores the fact
that there was .a contract whereby the defendants agreed
to design and supervise the construction of an adequate
heating and cooling system. 'The instruction is contrary
to the agreement as testified to by the defendant Brazier
and to the other evidence in the case.
I~struction No. 7 (R. 51, 587, Exception R. 594-595)
is also claimed as error primarily because the instruction ignores the admitted oral agreement and, contrary
to the evidence, implies that changes in the plans were
made without the approval of the defendant architects,
the defendant Brazier having expressly assumed responsibility for the heating and cooling system as designed and installed.

The court's Instruction No. 10 (R. 54, 588-599, Exception R. 595) is assigned as error not only because it
is inconsistent with Instruction No. 11 (R. 55, 589) but
also that itt fails to instruct upon a measure of damage
consistent with the contracturalliability of the defendant
architects.
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3. The court erred in refusing Plaintiffs' Requested
Instructions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 10 (R. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19,
21, 23, Exceptions R. 595-596) and in modifying Plaintiffs' Requested Instructions 5, 9 and 12-A (R. 18, 22,
30, Exceptions 595-596).
4. The court erred in giving inconsistent instruetion.s, particularly its Instructions No. 6 and 10 referred
to above.
5. The evidence is insufficient to support the verdict against the plaintiffs of no cause of action and the
verdict of the jury in that regard is contrary to law.
6. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's
verdict on defendants' counterclaim and the same is
contrary to law.
7. The court erred in overruling plaintiffs' motion
for new trial (R. 62-64).
ARGUMENT
1.

DEFENDANTS FAILED TO FULFILL THEIR
CONTRACT.

'There can be no serious doubt but what the defendants agreed to design an "adequate" heating and cooling
system. It is .adn1itted in the record that the airfloor
duct system \vas relatively new in the construction of
homes in the Salt Lali:e Yalley where one would take
knowledge of the extreme seasonal fluctuations in temper-
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atures. The duct system was encased in concrete and
all of the testimony was to the effect that it would be
unworkable if it restricted the flow of the return air to
the furnaces. The defendants held them.selves out to bB
skilled architects and building engineers. In the nomenclature of their business they are presumed to know and
to have intended all that the word "adequate" connotes.
1

Webster's New International Dictionary defines the
word "adequate" as fully sufficient, equal to what is
required, lawfully and reasonably sufficient.
The fact that Dr. Schick and his family had to wear
sweaters and other outdoor clothing with the thermostat
set at 85 and the room temperatures in the 60s in the
wintertime is evidence in i'tself of the inadequacy of defendants' performance. The defendants should have foreseen the consequence of the improper installation as
testified to by Mr. Hassell, but, in any event, they were
required by their contract to furnish an adequate
system. Under the definition of the word ".adequate," the
defendants were charged with the absolute duty to construct a heating and cooling system so as to make the
living quarters comfortable and livable. There can be no
dispute from the evidence that they failed in this regard.
o

As w.as said in Adams Radiator & Boiler W arks v.s.
Schnader (Pa. 1893), 26 Atl. 745, a dwelling house heater
is in use every hour of the day and night; it is absolutely
indispensable to the householder and his family. Dr.
Schick, his wife and his family were the ones to test and
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to declare what wa.s adequate, and defendant Brazier
knew of Dr. Schick's exactitude in the premises. As was
said in the Adams Radiator case, where the contract required the installation of a heating system to be constructed in a good, thorough and workmanlike manner
and to give entire satisfaction in its operation and to
work entirely noiseless, the only test was whether the
householder had given the system a thorough and reasonable trial in the ordinary daily use of it; that he w.as
not dissatisfied by a dishonest declaration of dissatisfaction, and that his po.sition was taken in good faith.
The heating system was condemned by defendants'
own witness Olsen, and from which testimony, taken in
the light of Brazier's testimony as to the oral contract
of adequacy, the only issue that should have been the coneern of the jury was that of the damage to the plaintiffs.
The trial court departed from the contractual theory in
its Instructions 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11. It confused the measure of defendants' performance with that of an architect
who designs a home without any express contract as to
the functional side of his plans and specifications.
Defendants' counsel recognized that the action was
one in contract and not in tort (R. 328). The defendant
Ashton, when Dr. Schick c01nplained about the frosting
of the window.s, stated that a correction could be 1nade
by vertical discharge up the window sills that could
discharge warm air. The defendant Ashton was not the
one that suggested the change of location of the registers
(R. 324).
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The inadequacy of the heating and cooling system,
for which defendants admittedly assumed functional
responsibility, cannot be denied in the record. Without
the delivery of air measured in terms of c. f. m. as calculated by the two expert witnesses (Olsen and Hassell),
both of whom are professional, licensed, mechanical engineers, the house could not be adequately heated or cooled.
The trial court should not have submitted to the jury
the question of defendants' liability in light of the
admitted oral agreement to design and have installed an
adequate heating and cooling system. Barnett et al. vs.
Beggs (8th Cir., 1913), 208 F. 255; Gerisch vs. Herold
(N.J., 1912), 83 Atl. 892; Morgan vs. Gamble et al. (Pa.,
1911), 79 Atl. 410; Nagle vs. City of Billings (Mont.,
1926), 250 P. 445.
While what we have said goes to the first statement
of points, it, neverthele.ss, weaves its thread among the
remaining points as stated above, with the possible exception of point 6, and other than point 6 we will discuss
the remaining points under the following argument.
2.

THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE ERRONEOUS,
CONFUSING AND CONFLICTING.

By way of example, Instruction No.5 (R. 49) ignores
the express contract between the parties and charges the
jury that the defendants would only be required to exerci.se the skill ordinarily and reasonably required of one
in their profession. 'The defendants, admittedly skilled
architects and building engineers, went beyond the expression contained in the instruction when they specifi-
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cally agreed to install an adequate heating and cooling
system and, in terms of performance, represented that it
would function properly.
Comparing Instructions 6, 10 and 11 will demonstr.ate that the case was in utter confusion as it was submitted to the jury. In Instruction 6 the abstract statement is made that the defendant architects are not held
to the standards of performance "subjectively imposed by
Dr. and Mrs. Schick." There was no issue in the case
as to subjectively imposed .standards of performance.
The issue was whether there was a contract and, if so,
was it performed and, if not, the plaintiffs' damage incident to such non-performance. The instruction not only
ignores the contract between the parties, but is irreconcilable with Instruction 11. The latter instructs as to the
measure of damage if the jury finds such damage to be
the direct and proximate cause of the failure to design
or install an "adequate" heating or cooling system. Instruction 6 cannot be reconciled ·with performance or the
failure to design or install an "adequate" systen1. Instruction 10 recites two 1neasures of dmnage, the dividing
line being whether the defect can be corrected "ithout
unreasonable or disproportionate expense and leaving to
conjecture what those words 1ne.an.
Instruction 9 is in itself inconsistent and n1ade so by
the modification of Plaintiffs" Requested Instruction 5.
One part of the instruction would ilnpose absolute liability upon the defendant architPcts. which we concede to
be the law. ThP other part refers to the confused stand-
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ards of performance elsewhere found in the instructions.
It is significant that the defendants likewise objected to
Instructions 6, 9, 10 and 11 and stated with reference
thereto that they were incon.sistent (R. 596-598).
As pointed out above, the Schicks either had a contract requiring the design and installation of an adequate
heating and cooling system or else they did not. By the
use of the words "standards of performance subjectively
imposed by Dr. and Mrs. Schick" the entire issue is distorted and the defendants' own testimony is ignored.
There is no room in this case for the connotation of a socalled "subjective standard," which means something
being derived from one's own mind, the direct opposite
of an objective standard of performance to which the
defendants were committed.
1\Ir. Braizer knew of Dr. Schick's sensitivities resulting in his experience from a former inadequate heating
system. Mr. Brazier testified that his firm would plan
and cause to be installed an adequate heating system.
There is no evidence to the contrary. Mr. Olsen, the
defendants' witness, unequivocally stated that the heating
system designed and installed was not adequate. He
corroborated the plaintiffs' witness Mr. Hassell in that
regard. The sub-normal room temperatures testified to
by Dr. and Mrs. Schick, the frosting of the windows, the
discomfort to them and to their family, the fact that they
had to wear sweaters and heavy co.ats, with the thermostat set at 85° F. and the interior heat not much above 60°

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
F., viewed in light of the .admitted contraet, are not indicative of subje<rtive standards but are proof of the
failure of the defendant .architects to perform objectively.
Instruction 10 qualifies the liability of the architects
when it s1ays thrut if their failure results in a defect that
can be corrected without an unreasonable or disproportionate expense "then the architect is liable to the Schicks
for the reasonable cost of such correction," but if the
defeet cannot be remedied at a reasonable expense not
disproportionate to the results to be obtained or without
tearing down and rebuilding the structure, then the measure of damage is the difference between the value of Dr.
Schick's home at the time of completion as it was actually
constructed and the value which it would have had at
that time had the plans ~and specifications prepared by
the architects been adequate. The term "unreasonable
or disproportionate" is contrary to any law that we are
aware of when dealing with an express contract and to
us, at lea.st, is most confusing and uncertain as a guide
to the jury.
As between Instructions 6 and 10, and in fact the
whole case, the terms "standards of performance subjectively imposed'' are entirely foreign to the issue and are
misleading and confusing. As between Instruction No. 10
and No. 11 the confusion is compounded becau.se in the
latter the jury is told that it can talm into consideration
e:x:cessive power bills, the an1ount of n1oney that the
plaintiffs have expended in an effort to iinprove the
situation, the loss that the plaintiffs 1nay have suffered
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in depreciation in the value of their home, the amount
that the plaintiffs might be required to spend to remedy
the situation and .a sum of money as in the judgment of
the jury might compensate the plaintiffs for mental distress and physical suffering. Instructions 10 and 11 are
completely irreconcilable.
It is not a question as to which one of the instructions was right. The point is that the instructions misled and confused the jury because on the face of the
record the jury is left in doubt .and without any certain
guide as to the law arising upon the evidence. The inconsistency in the instructions is sufficient error alone to
require a reversal and a new trial. See 53 Am. Jur.,
Trial, page 445, Section 557; State vs. Waid, 92 Utah 297,
67 P. 2d 647; Sorenson vs. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 P. 72;
Nagle vs. City of Billings, supra.

3.

THE $400.00 VERDICT ON DEFENDANTS'
COUNTERCLAIM IS CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND TO LAW.

Under the pleadings, .assuming the defendants had
performed their contract, there remained an item of
$1,107.47 owing to the defendants as the balance of their
6% fee. There is nothing in the record to justify a lesser
or any greater amount if the defendants were correct.
On the other hand, if the defendants had failed to perform their side of the barg.ain they were entitled to
nothing. The jury compromised the situation and
whether out of sympathy for the plaintiffs or because
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of a dim view of what the defendants claimed to have
done or because of some arbitrary notion that the defendants were entitled to something, even though they
had not fully performed, remains .a mystery. There is
no evidence and there was no theory advanced to support
a verdict in favor of the defendants for $400.00. The
evidence is wholly insufficient in that regard and is
clearly against law.
The instructions, confused as they are, did not permit the jury to speculate or compromise on the balance
of the compen.sation alleged to be owing from the plaintiffs to the defendants. Instruction 12 (R. 56) tells the
jury that if the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, the
defendants are not entitled to any recovery by way of
counterclaim or offset and the verdict on defendants'
counterclaim should be in favor of the plaintiffs and
,against the defendants.
Instruction 1 (R. 44) states as the issue on defendants' counterdaim that the unpaid balance of their fee
was $1,107.47. The verdict of $400.00 in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs is indicative of what
may be expected by confusing, inconsistent .and contradictory instructions as above pointed out and juries
might well take such a situation as a license upon their
part to disregard any concept of law and to do whatever
they please in any given .situation.
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CONCLUSION
From what has been said before and from the record
as a whole the trial court erred in submitting to the jury
the question of defendants' liability in light of the admitted oral agreement to design and have installed an
adequate heating and cooling system in plaintiffs' home.
The confused and contradictory instructions could well
have left with the jury that a no cause for action verdict
against the plaintiffs was the only course to follow.
The verdict rendered by the jury on defendants' counterclaim is indicative of the confused state of all of the
instructions given to it, and particularly those that are
specifically referred to. The evidence is insufficient to
support the verdict against the plaintiffs of no cause of
action and the verdict in that regard is contrary to law,
and the court erred in overruling plaintiffs' motion for a
new trial.
The plaintiffs have been substantially damaged by
the failure of the defendants to perform as they agreed
to. The value of their home, equipped with an inadequate
heating and cooling system, the ducts pertaining to the
same being imbedded in concrete, is obviously substantially impaired. In the interest of substantial justice between the parties, this Court, it is respectfully .suggested,
should declare the law of the case, reverse the judgment
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appealed from and remand the .same with such instructions as to the Court may seem proper.
Respectfully submitted,

HARLEY W. GUSTIN
J. THOMAS GREENE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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